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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over final orders, judgments and
decrees of the Third District Court under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-102(3)0).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR APPEAL
ISSUE #1: The trial court erred in holding that Mr. Yates owed an
independent duty to the Reighards as a builder/contractor, particularly in light of
the undisputed fact that Mr. Yates, who built the subject home, had resided in the
home for nearly 2lA years before selling the used home to the Reighards.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether a duty exists is
a question of law and involves the examination of the legal relationships between
the parties. Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing Homeowners Association v.
Davencourt at Pilgrims Landing, LC, 2009 UT 65, 221 P.3d 234. Questions of law
are reviewed by the appellate court de novo and are not granted any deference.
Appellate review of a trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized
by the term "correctness." "Correctness" means the appellate court decides
the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's
determination of law. State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see Kennecott
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised in a

l

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment filed on April 7, 2008 (R.312), again in the
Motion in Limine re: Construction filed on September 28, 2009 (R.1326), argued
during the course of the trial in connection with the jury instructions (R.l 702 at
p. 177), in Defendant's Motion for a Directed Verdict (R.1349) and in Defendant's
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alternative, for
Reduction of the Jury's Verdict, filed October 14, 2009 (R.1481).
ISSUE #2: The trial court erred in upholding the jury's award
against Mr. Yates, based upon negligence, in light of the fact that Davencourt,
decided on the day of the jury's deliberations and verdict, held there is no duty to
conform to building codes and no independent duty to act without negligence in
the construction of a home.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The question of whether a duty exists is
a question of law and involves the examination of the legal relationships between
the parties. Davencourt, supra. Questions of law are reviewed by the appellate
court de novo and are not granted any deference. Appellate review of a trial court's
determination of the law is usually characterized by the term "correctness."
"Correctness" means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not
defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v. Pena, 869
P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431 (Utah 1993); Kennecott Corp. v.
State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
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PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW:

;

^sue was raised In Mi

Yates in his Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the
Alternative, for Reduction of the Jury's Verdict, filed on or about November 9,
2009. (R. 1480.)
ISSUE #3: The trial court erred in ruling that the economic loss
doctrine did not bar Plaintiffs claims, because there was no admissible evidence of
the type and amount of mold in the home, and there was no evidence of medical
causation between the exposure

\ /vian Reighard's ant '• mi b

Reighard's physical symptoms.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The applicability of the economic loss
doctrine is a question of law. Davencourt, supra. The question of whether a duty
exists is a question of law and involves the examination of the legal relationships
betwec the

' 'jvencourt, supra. Questions of law are reviewed by the

appellate court de novo and are not granted any deference. Appellate review of a
trial court's determination of the law is usually characterized by the term
"correctness." "Correctness" means the appellate court decides the matter for itself
and does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law. State v.
Pena, 869 P.2d 932 (Utah 1994); State v. Deli, 861 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993); see
Kennecott Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 858 P.2d 1381, 1383 (Utah 1993).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was ra

3

-d -

vlr.

Yates in his Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment Dismissing Negligence Claim (l 5t Cause of Action), filed on or about
May 5, 2008. (R.583-84.) This issue was also raised in the Reply Memorandum in
Support of Mr. Yates' Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the
Alternative, for Reduction of the Jury's Verdict, filed on or about November 9,
2009.(R.1578.)
ISSUE #4: The trial court abused its discretion in allowing Eugene
Cole, a Ph.D. in Public Health, and a non-physician, to testify as an expert witness
about the relationship between exposures to mold and alleged health effects
resulting from that exposure or to diagnose conditions allegedly suffered by Aidan
Reighard and Alan Reighard.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: The qualification of an expert witness
lies in the discretion of the court. State v. Locke, 688 P.2d 464 (Utah 1984).
However, a three-step analysis is required for admission of scientific evidence:
1) are the scientific principles and techniques supporting the expert's testimony
inherently reliable; 2) have the scientific principles and techniques upon which the
expert relies been properly applied to the facts of the case; and 3) is the evidence
more probative than prejudicial. State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 641 (Utah 1996).
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised by Mr.
Yates in his Motion to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Eugene Cole and Charles
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Dixon (Plaintiffs' Mold Witnesses), filed on or about August 4, 2009. (R.981).
This issue was also raised at trial when Dr. Cole was called by the Reighards to
testify as a witness. (R. 1700 at pp. 13-14).
ISSUE #5: The trial court erred in awarding the Reighards' costs as
part of the Final Judgment in this matter, because Mr. Yates had properly served an
Offer of Judgment upon the Reighards in an amount that was more than the
"adjusted award."
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Interpretation of a rule of procedure
presents a purely legal question that is accorded no deference and the trial court's
decision is reviewed for correctness. Gordon v. Maughan, 2009 UT App. 25, | 4 ,
2 0 4 I'...Hi ISO.

PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issued was raised by
Mr. Yates in his Memorar.

••;•••>

1*1.*'

'•. v • ['

Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs, filed on or about October 2b, 2009. \K. 1 :> iz).
ISSUE #6: The trial court erred in ruling that Mr. Yates was not the
prevailing party in this matter and in denying him his attorney fees, under the Real
Estate I'mi hasc ( Onlract.
STANDARD OF REVIEW: Which party is the prevailing party is an
appropriate question in the sound discretion of the trial roml. dependm;." . >n tin
context of each case. Review is an abuse of discretion standard. Appropriate

5

considerations for the trial court would include, but are not limited to, (1)
contractual language, (2) the number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc.,
brought by the parties, (3) the importance of the claims relative to each other and
their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and (4) the
dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with the various claims.
R.T. Nielson Co, v. Cook 2002 UT 11, |25, 40 P.3d 1119.
PRESERVATION OF ISSUE BELOW: This issue was raised by Mr.
Yates in his Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs, filed on or about October 26, 2009. (R.1512).
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY
Utah R. Civ. P. 68. Settlement Offers
(a) Unless otherwise specified, an offer made under this rule is an offer to
resolve all claims in the action between the parties to the date of the offer,
including costs, interest and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract,
attorney fees.
(b) If the adjusted award is not more favorable than the offer, the offeror is
not liable for costs, prejudgment interest or attorney fees incurred by the offeree
after the offer, and the offeree shall pay the offeror's costs incurred after the offer.
The court may suspend the application of this rule to prevent manifest injustice.
(c) An offer made under this rule shall: (1) be in writing; (2) expressly refer
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to this rule; (3) be made more than 10 days before trial; (4) remain open for at least
10 days; and (5) be served on the offeree under Rule 5.
Acceptance of the offer shall be in writing and served on the offeror under
Rule 5. Upon acceptance, either party may file the offer and acceptance with a
proposed judgment under K i ile 58 A
(d) "Acl ji isted aw ard" it i leans tl le an 101 n it aw ai ded b;; ' tl ic fit iclei of fact ai id,
unless excluded by the offer, the offeree's costs and interest incurred before the
offer, and, if attorney fees are permitted by law or contract and not excluded by the
offer, the offeree's reasonable attorney fees incurred before the offer. If the
offeree's attorney fees are subject to a contingency fee agreement, the court shall
determine a reasonable attorney fee •

he period preceding the offer.

II(iiIII1 Ill: Evidence 702 ** •
(a) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto ii I tl :te for i t :i • i>f a i i opu lioi i oi :)tl iei \ vise.
(b) Scientific, technical, oi other specializes

>wledge may serv e j is 1 .1 n :

basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles
or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they
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(i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have
been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(c) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the
facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert
community.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This case stems from a dispute relating to a home located at 2478

Daybreaker Drive in Park City, Utah. Mr. Yates constructed the home in 2001,
intending to use it as his personal residence, and he resided in the home from
November 2001 until approximately March 2004. The Reighards purchased the
used home in February 2004 and had lived in the home for nearly 2 lA years when,
in August 2006, Ms. Reighard discovered a small patch of mold in the basement of
the home. Ms. Reighard suspected the mold had been causing alleged health
problems for her infant son, Aidan Reighard, and for Mr. Reighard. Ms. ELeighard
immediately called a mold remediation company and shortly thereafter had all of
the stucco from nearly the entire home removed and replaced.
The Reighards claimed Mr. Yates was responsible for the damage because

8

he was the contractor for the home, an<

vvsi

•

>al was held in

October 2009 and, after the trial court considered post-trial motions, a final
judgment was entered in June 2010 against Mr. Yates in favor of the Reighards in
the amount of $10,419.25—a $7,500.00 reduced jury award arising from
negligence and $2,919.25 in costs. Because the trial court incorrectly decided
several issues in this matter, this appeal followed.
B.

C m i l si ill' Pi m i rilin ' i ,1111! I)is|iiisiliiin lt< Inw

Alan and Suzy Reighard, husband and wife, and Aidan Reighard, the
Reighard's infant son, filed a Complaint1 against Mr. Steven Yates on February 1,
2007 seeking damages related to seven (7) causes of action: (1) Negligence, (2)
Breach of Contract, (3) Breach of Express Warranty, (4) Negligent
Misrepresentation, (5) Fraudulent Misrepresentation (f^ Fraudulent Concealment
and (7) Fraudulent Non-Disclosure. (R.001).

='

>•'••< =
• *'i:rd-Party

Complaint against E. Marshall Plastering, the stucco contractor on the home, in
November 2007. (R.097). E. Marshall Plastering later settled with the Reighards
by making a payment to them for $5,000.00 and was dismissed from the case on
September 30, 2008

>^r,\

1

Although Suzy Reighard's brother, Daniel S. Drage, filed the initial Complaint,
Ms. Reighard's sister, Christine E. Drage, who is a California attorney, appeared
Pro Hac Vice throughout the rest of the matter, with Ms. Drage's California
associate, Trevor Resurreccion filing most of the pleadings.

9

In April 2008, Mr. Yates, through counsel, filed three (3) Motions for
Partial Summary Judgment: (1) Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing
Negligence Claim (1 st Cause of Action) (R.309); (2) Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment to Dismiss Contract (2nd and 3rd) Causes of Action (R.316); and (3)
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing Fraud (5th, 6th, and 7th) Causes
of Action (R.326).2
In his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment relating to the
Reighards' negligence claim, Mr. Yates argued that the claims were barred by the
economic loss doctrine because Mr. Yates had not acted as the Reighards'
contractor and therefore owed them no duties outside of the REPC; further, the
Reighards could not prove bodily injury, further barring their negligence claims
under the economic loss doctrine. (R.312-14). The trial court denied the Motion
stating that Mr. Yates "owed Plaintiffs a duty of care as the builder/contractor/
seller of the home." (R.778). The trial court also denied Mr. Yates' other two (2)
Motions for Partial Summary Judgment citing unresolved issues of fact. (R.77981).
During discovery, Alan Reighard's physician, Dr. Brian Drage
(another brother of Ms. Reighard and who had also treated Aidan), was deposed.
During his deposition, Dr. Drage admitted he could not testify with any reasonable

2

An Errata to this Motion also included the 4th Cause of Action. (R.340).
10

medical certainty that f\ li R eigl i< ird's or Aidai i""s he<: 11.1.:1 i problems were caused by
the mold in the home. (R.218, 219).
A four-day trial was held in this matter from September 29 - October
2, 2009. (R.l 143). Dr. Drage was called as a witness and, again, testified that
there was no evidence of medical causation between Aidan Reighard's health
symptoms and exposure to llie mold am! lhal lit1 |a,\; /Man1!1; unending physician)
had never provided medical livatmnil to Alan that 1 ic believed was causually
connected to the mold in the home. (R.l700 at p. 65). The Reighards called Dr.
Eugene Cole, a professor at BYU, who testified there were "potential associations
and relationships between the adverse environmental conditions and their adverse
health symptoms," but because he was not a medical doctor, he could not testify as
r

to medical cai isatiot i (R 1' \ •Hung Cheung, a medical cic

.es presented < :

^:* - v :

;

>r.

ii.u., who agreed win u\. i^ragc b opinion

that there was insufficient evidence of causation. (R.1701 at p. 145). Additionally,
there was no admissible testimony presented at trial as to the type or amount of
mold either on the surfaces or in the air of the home. {See Footnote 6, infra, at p.
24.)
• .

Based upon I >rleml;ini \ Motion lor a Diieelrd Venliel pin i In the

case being submitted to the jury, all but three claims against Mr. Yates were
dismissed; only the claims for negligent misrepresentation, negligence, and breach

n

of contract were submitted to the jury. (R. 1444-49). The jury found in favor of the
Reighards only on the negligence claim and awarded the Reighards $10,000.00 in
property damage, $0.00 in medical expenses, $0.00 for loss of use and enjoyment
of residence, $0.00 for other economic loss, and $2,500.00 in non-economic
damages, including pain and suffering, for a total award of $12,500.00. (R.1445).
The jury found in favor of Mr. Yates on the negligent misrepresentation cause of
action and determined that the Reighards, themselves, had breached the REPC.
(R.1446, 1448).
After the trial, Mr. Yates filed a Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict arguing, again, that the Reighards' negligence claim
was barred by the absence of duty and the economic loss doctrine. (R. 1480-83).
The Davencourt opinion, which was issued by this Court the same day the jury
entered its special verdict in this matter, further supported Mr. Yates' arguments.
(R. 1480-83). However, the trial court again held that the economic loss doctrine
did not bar the Reighards5 negligence claim, and denied the Motion. (R. 1625-27).
The trial court did, however, grant Mr. Yates' post-trial Motion to
reduce the jury's verdict by the $5,000.00 the Reighards received from E. Marshall
Plastering; the final judgment for damages was reduced to $7,500.00. (R. 1627).
Mr. Yates had served an Offer of Judgment, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 68, on the
Reighards in September 2007 in the amount of $10,000.00. (Attached as Exhibit
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"A" to Mr. Yates' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Award of
Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs (R.1512)). Yet despite this Offer of Judgment,
the trial court still awarded costs to the Reighards. (R.1632,1668-71).
C.

Statement of Facts

1. Mr. Steven Yates constructed the home located at 2478 Day breaker Drive,
Park City, Summit Comil\ 111'X lOON in '1)01 inleiidnr In use il ;is his personal
residence. (R.320).
2. A certificate of occupancy was obtained on the property on November 9,
2001 and Mr. Yates resided in the home from approximately that date until
approximately March 2004. (R.320).
3. Mr. Yates listed the home for sale in early 2004 and the Reighards made an
offer t>

:

chase tli home almost immediately niereafter -^
••'.'. i. '

'• ie, Ms. Reighan

;

<).

JJI bueily williMr. iuu• it

the home; Mr. Reighard never met with Mr. Yates until years after the home was
purchased. (R.320).
5. Ms. Reighard's only conversation with Mr. Yates prior to purchase of the
home was to It'll him il was a beautiful house; no represent, itions were i ,ak ••"

standard written property disclosures provided as part of the sale of the property.
(R.320).
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6. Likewise, neither Mr. Reighard nor Ms. Reighard had any conversations
with Mr. Yates' real estate agent, Ms. Barb Sandford, prior to the purchase of the
home. 321. The only discussions that Mr. and Ms. Reighard had had with respect
to their real estate agent were irrelevant to the status of the construction and/or
cannot be recalled. (R.321).
7. Mr. Yates and the Reighards entered into a standard Real Estate Purchase
Contract ("REPC") in February 2004 for the purchase of the home at a final
purchase price of $680,000.00. This REPC was the only contract entered into by
the parties. (R.321, R.001 "Exhibit "A"). A copy of the REPC is included in the
Addendum as Exhibit " 1 . "
8. At the time of the purchase, the Reighards were aware that Mr. Yates had
constructed the home. However, they understood that they were buying, and
intended to buy, a used and previously occupied home and the parties used the
standard Real Estate Purchase Contract. (R.310-311). (Addendum Exhibit 1.)
9. Prior to closing the sale, the Reighards had an independent real estate
inspection conducted by a company called Amerispec; Amerispec provided a
report on February 4, 2004 and the report indicated there were no notable defects
with the home. (R.248).
10. An appraisal was also conducted on the home prior to the purchase; the
appraisal indicated that the home was, at that time, effectively three (3) years old.

14

(R.248).
11. The Reighards moved into the home in approximately March 2004 and
continued to reside in the home at least through the commencement of this action
in 2007. (R.248, 001).
12. During the first summer of their occupancy (2004), the Reighards had
various sprinkler repairs performed.

wever, neither Mr. Reighard nor Ms.

Reighard can identify the nature of all the repairs nor identify the contractor who
made the repairs. (R.248, 360-61).
13. In the summer of 2005, the Reighards had a deck installed on a corner of
the home; in connection with that deck, excavation was performed on the
northwest corner of the home. (R.361). Neither Mr. Reighard nor Ms. Reighard
knows the details of the excavation r sprinkl

'• lications made in connection

with the deck's install; •>

^"»

'-.,••

•••••,

:
:

;• ., >r

"scraped [] off the top layer of soil on the corner of the house where the mold was
[later] discovered." (R.248-49).
14. In August 2006, nearly 2 Y2 years after living in the home and over 4 V2
years after the home was constructed, Ms. Reighard discovered a patch of mold
underneath a windowsill in a basement family room. (R.249).
15. Ms. Reighard suspected the mold had been causing alleged health problem
for her infant son, Aidan, and for Mr. Reighard. (R.476, 481).
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16. Also within a day or two, the Reighards obtained the services of a
contractor who exposed the sheetrock in the basement location in an attempt to
remediate the mold. (R.249).
17. After the sheetrock had been removed, and the additional mold had been
exposed, various companies came to perform testing for the levels of airborne
mold in the home. (R.249).
18. There is no evidence available as to the levels of airborne mold in the home
prior to the removal of the sheetrock and exposure of additional mold which
occurred in August of 2006. (R.249). No evidence was presented at trial as to the
types or levels of mold in the home, at anytime. {See the Record generally.)
19. Subsequent to the discovery of the mold, the Reighards retained a
contractor, RAM Builders, to perform exterior repairs on the home. Although the
Reighards blame Mr. Yates for the problems with their home, Mr. Yates was not
advised of the contract with RAM Builders and was not provided any opportunity
to inspect the home prior to or during the course of the construction. (R.249).
RAM Builders' contract for the remediation work contained a five year warranty;
RAM Builders5 witness, Shaan Sanderson, conceded that a claim against RAM's
stucco installation, if made five years following installation, would be denied.
(R.1700@p.l01).
20. Subsequent to repairs being made by RAM Builders, and in February 2007,
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the Reighards lilrd a complaint against Mi

s containing seven (7) causes of

action: (1) Negligence, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Breach of Express Warranty, (4)
Negligent Misrepresentation, (5) Fraudulent Misrepresentation, (6) Fraudulent
Concealment, and (7) Fraudulent Non-Disclosure. (R.001).
ARGUMENT
I.BEC U S I \\\U.\ \ I IS IMIMNni <>\H \ m IINDI'I'I •'IV DENT
DUTIES TO THE REIGHARDS, THE NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS SHOULD
HAVE BEEN DISMISSED AS A MATTER OF LAW
The Reighards have contended throughout this matter, and the trial court
agreed, that because Mr. Yates built the home in question, he automatically owed
an independent duty to the Reighards as a builder-contractor. The existence of
such .i

<

specifical

' '•

Jer-evenonb

i nome lor « mother - was expressly rejected by this Court in

Davencourt. 2009 UT 65, |47. "Therefore we conclude that the district court
properly rejected the independent duty to act without negligence in the
construction of a home." It would be an absurd result if Mr. Yates, who built the
house for himsc < u

here for several years thereafter before selling it

pursuant to a standard form REPC, were to owe a greater duty to his purchasers
than an expressly retained builder would have.
The Reighards and the court below based their basis for a finding of an
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independent duty on the Court of Appeals decisions of Moore v. Smith, 2007 UT
App. 101,134, 158 P.3d 562 and Yazdv. Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT47,
%14-15. The sections of Yazd and Moore upon which the Plaintiffs and Court
relied, however, respected a builder's duties of disclosure and not of negligent
construction. The result of the Moore opinion was a remand as to "whether the
[defects] were material, whether the Smiths had knowledge of the defects, and
whether they failed to disclose those defects to the Moores." Id at ^36. In this
case, the court allowed the jury to evaluate the evidence and decide the negligent
misrepresentation cause of action, and the jury found that the Defendant had used
reasonable care in determining the truth of all representations that he made.
(R.1446).
Furthermore, even in Moore, the court stated: "whether a duty exists is
strictly a question of law; it grows out of the relationship between the parties, and
the duties created by that relationship."
A relationship that is highly attenuated is less likely to be
accompanied by a duty than one, for example, in which parties
are in privity of contract. Age, knowledge, influence,
3

The trial court's pre-Davencourt analysis of this issue interpreted Yazd as
providing that Yates, as a builder "owed a duty to Plaintiffs beyond anything they
contractually agreed to." (R.778). This statement, of course, runs counter to the
fundamental basis for the adoption of the economic loss rule, which is to allow the
liability of builders to be defined by contract. "The law of torts imposes no
standards on the parties' performance of the contract; the only standards are those
agreed upon by the parties." American Towers Owners Ass % Inc. v. CCI Meek,
Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190 (Utah 1996).
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bargaining power, sophistication, and cognitive ability are but
the more prominent among a multitude of life circumstances
that a court may consider in analyzing whether a legal duty is
owed by one party to another. Where a disparity in one or
more of these circumstances distorts the balance between the
parties in a relationship to the degree that one party is exposed
to unreasonable risk, the law may intervene by creating a duty
on the advantaged party to conduct itself in a manner that does
not reward exploitation of its advantage.
Id. (citu Li ),/_ •

Woodside Homes Corp., 2006 UT 47, \ 16, 143 P.3d

283).
In the instant matter, Mr. Yates did not act as the Reighards' builder or
contractor; Mr. Yates had not even met the Reighards at the time he was
constructing the home nor was he intending to build the home for anyone other
than himself. Mr. Yates built the home as his own personal residence and resided
in the home for nearly 2 lA years before selling the home to the Reighards. At the
time of the purchase, the Reighards obtained their own home inspection and knew
that they were purchasing a used home, and they knowingly chose to purchase a
used home.4
The only relationship Mr. Yates had with the Reighards was that as a seller
4

The parties' standard REPC was limited in its provisions respecting the condition
of the property conveyed, particularly as to the aspects of construction complained
of by the Reighards. As to the roof and foundation, the REPC warranted only that
"the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller." The Reighards
produced no evidence that Mr. Yates knew of any leaks at the time of sale or prior,
and the Reighards themselves were unaware of any alleged leaks until several
years after they purchased and moved into the home. See Complaint (R.001),
generally and specifically Exh.D thereof, reflecting photos taken in August 2006.
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of a used home. The only contract between the parties was the Real Estate
Purchase Contract. Unlike the builder in Moore who only lived in the home for
three (3) weeks, Mr. Yates lived in the home for nearly 2 Vi years, which fact
greatly differentiates this case from Moore and Yazd. In fact, the Utah Court of
Appeals in Moore expressly suggested that Yazd may not be applicable to
situations such as Mr. Yates', stating "Yazd did not address the question of whether
builder-contractors have a duty to remote purchasers, and we do not address that
question here.. .The three-week occupancy of the home by the Smiths and contract
to sell to the Moores before completion of construction, however, are insufficient
to remove this case from the reach of Yazd" Moore, 2007 UT App. 101, Fn. 11.
The Reighards also attempted to support their negligence claims based upon
allegations of building code violations; to the extent they did so, the evidence was
irrelevant. In Davencourt, this Court specifically stated "No common-law duty
exists that creates a duty to conform to building codes." 2009 UT 65, f44.
II. UNDERDAVENCOURT AND THE ECONOMIC LOSS RULE,
THE JURY'S AWARD FOR NEGLIGENCE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SET
ASIDE
Based upon the trial court's ruling that Mr. Yates had an independent duty to
the Reighards as a builder-contractor, the Reighards' negligence claims were
allowed to proceed to the jury. Based thereon, the Reighards presented their case to
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the jury based upon their evidence that Mr. Yates failed to conform to the building
code in several respects and was ultimately responsible therefore, and also that he,
as the builder, was negligent in constructing the home. Even assuming such a duty
existed, however, the Plaintiffs were precluded from recovering economic damages
under a negligence theory, in the absence of "physical property damage [i.e,
damage to other property,] or bodily injury." SME Indus., Inc. v. Thompson,
Ventulett, Stainback & Assocs, Inc., 2001 UT 54, f32, 28 P.2d 669.
While the jury was deliberating on October 2, 2009, this Court issued its
Davencourt opinion, and re-addressed the economic loss doctrine in connection
with claims against builders. The Court first held that "we do not believe that
building codes create an independent legal duty for purposes of avoiding the
economic loss rule." 2009 UT 65 at f 43. This Court's opinion analyzed the
history and determined that "[n]o common-law duty exists that creates a duty to
conform to building codes." Id. at ^[44; this Court held that the District Court had
properly dismissed the Association's claim for negligence per se, based upon the
absence of an independent duty. Id.
This Court next held that the economic loss rule continues to preclude any
independent duty for a contractor to build without negligence. This Court stated,
"we conclude that the District Court properly rejected the independent duty to act
without negligence in the construction of a home." Id at f 47. As this Court stated
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in American Towers, "contract principles resolve issues when the product does not
meet the user's expectations, while tort principles resolve issues when the product
is unsafe to person or property." 930 P.2d 1182 @1190.
In this case, even assuming the existence of some negligence other than in
connection with the construction or building code violations, the economic loss
rule would also preclude recovery, due to the absence of any physical property
damage or bodily injury. In light of the absence of any admissible evidence of
bodily injury, and further by the jury's express finding that there were no medical
expenses caused by the negligence5, the trial court erred in not setting aside the
jury's verdict.
This Court continued "Finally, we emphasize that this implied warranty does
not abrogate the doctrine of caveat emptor in the sale of existing or used
residences." Id. at *{ 62. As the Reighards both acknowledge that they knew at the
time of the purchase that it was a used home, the doctrine of caveat emptor
excludes their claims.
III. THE PLAINTIFFS FAILED TO PRESENT ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF BODILY INJURY
As is set forth above, the economic loss doctrine holds that "economic
damages are not recoverable in negligence absent physical property damage or
5

As to the medical expenses associated with the negligence, the jury found $0.
(R.1445).
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bodily injury." SME Industries v. Thompson, 2001 UT 54, f32, 28 P.3d 669 (citing
American Towers Owners Ass 'n, Inc. v. CCI Meek, Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1190
(Utah 1996)). Economic loss is defined as:
Damages for inadequate value, costs of repair and replacement of the
defective product, or consequent loss of profits - without any claim of
personal injury or damage to other property...as well as 'the
diminution in the value of the product because it is inferior in quality
and does not work for the general purposes for which it was
manufactured and sold.'
American Towers Owners Association, Inc. v. CCI Mechanical, Inc., 930 P.2d
1182, 1189 (Utah 1996) (quoting Maack v. Resource Design & Construction, Inc.,
875 P.2d 570, 579-580 (Utah App. 1994)). Thus, economic damages are not
recoverable in negligence absent physical property damage to property other than
that negligently constructed, or bodily injury. American Towers, 930 P.2d at 1189.
There was no evidence of damage to other property presented at trial,
but the Reighards alleged that both Mr. Reighard and the Reighards' infant son,
Aidan Reighard, suffered bodily injury due to the mold in the home and attempted
to present evidence of this during trial. After hearing the evidence, the jury
awarded $10,000.00 for property damage to the residence, $0.00 in medical
expenses, $0.00 for loss of use and enjoyment of residence, $0.00 for other
economic loss, and $2,500.00 in non-economic damages, including pain and
suffering, for a total award of $12,500.00. (R.1445).
In addition, the jury was correct in its denial of medical expenses
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because neither of the only two (2) medical doctors that testified at trial, Dr. Brian
Drage (who was Mr. Reighard's brother-in-law and Aidan's uncle) and Dr. Hung
Cheung, testified with any reasonable medical certainty that the alleged health
effects suffered by Mr. Reighard and Aidan were causally connected to the mold
found in the home. (R.1700 at p. 65) ("Q: [to Dr. Drage] Have you ever provided
any medical treatment for Alan Reighard that you believe may be causally
connected to the mold in his home? A: No. ... Q: You do not believe that it can be
established [] with reasonable medical certainty that there was a causal connection
between Aiden's symptoms and the mold; correct? A: I saw Aiden once so my
ability to make that connection, I told you, I cannot."); (R.1701 at p. 145) (Dr.
Cheung concurs with Dr. Drage's inability to find causation.) And Dr. Eugene
Cole, a non-physician, conceded on cross-examination that he could not - and was
not - making any conclusion as to the mold conditions and the Reighards'
symptoms. (R.1700 at p. 46).
Still further, there was no admissible evidence presented by the
Reighards of the amount of or type of airborne mold that was in the home.

6

Mr. Yates is cognizant of his duty to "marshal the evidence" which would support
a finding respecting the amount or type of mold in the home. (Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9).). There was no such evidence presented however. None of the witnesses
who conceivably could have testified on this subject ended up testifying, and the
only evidence of mold arose from pictures, which could not identify the types of
mold, or the amount of airborne mold at any given time. Additionally, Mr. Yates
raised a timely challenge to the lack of evidence in this regard in its Motion in
24

IV. DR. EUGENE COLE, A PH.D., SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
ALLOWED TO TESTIFY AS AN EXPERT WITNESS REGARDING
HEALTH EFFECTS RESULTING FROM EXPOSURE TO MOLD
Utah R. Evid. Rule 702, which governs testimony by experts, was amended
in 2007 to clarify the jurisprudence on the issue and codify the test used to
determine whether a witness may testify as an expert. The rule now states:
(d) Subject to the limitations in subsection (b), if scientific, technical, or
other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify
thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.
(e) Scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge may serve as the
basis for expert testimony if the scientific, technical, or other principles
or methods underlying the testimony meet a threshold showing that they
(i) are reliable, (ii) are based upon sufficient facts or data, and (iii) have
been reliably applied to the facts of the case.
(f) The threshold showing required by subparagraph (b) is satisfied if the
principles or methods on which such knowledge is based, including the
sufficiency of facts or data and the manner of their application to the
facts of the case, are generally accepted by the relevant expert
community.
The Defendant initially sought to exclude Dr. Cole's testimony via a Motion
to Exclude the Expert Testimony of Eugene Cole and Charles Dixon, filed on
August 4, 2009 (R.981). Counsel for Mr. Yates continued this objection through
Limine to Exclude Testimony of Sattar N. Tabriz, P.E., R.L.S.; Zia Yasrobi, P.E.;
Kurt Salomon; and Charles Dixon, M.P.S.H., C.I.H., which was filed on March 24,
2008 (R. 224-40). Mr. Dixon, the only witness who had taken these airborne mold
samples, did not testify at trial.
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attempted voir dire of Dr. Cole at trial; that voir dire was terminated almost
immediately by the trial court judge, who indicated he would allow Dr. Cole to
testify. (R.14). Counsel for Mr. Yates objected to the ruling and anticipated
n

testimony at that time. Id.
In light of Rule 702, Dr. Eugene Cole did not qualify as expert witnesses,
and should not have been allowed to testify in this case. Further, because "the
qualification of a person as an expert witness is in the discretion of the trial court,"
this trial court should have excluded the testimony of this alleged expert and the
court abused its discretion in allowing this testimony. Green v. Louder^ 2001 UT
62424, 29 P.3d 638.
Dr. Cole holds a Ph.D. in Public Health. However, he testified at trial on the
Reighards' medical conditions and treatment in relation to the alleged mold growth
in their home. There was no indication from Dr. Cole's expert report that his public
health education, research, or experience qualified him to opine on the individual
diagnoses of Alan and Aidan Reighard or, more generally, the health effects of
human contact with mold in a residential setting. In fact, on cross-examination, he
7

Assuming that the Court agrees that the negligence claims should have been
dismissed based upon the absence of duty or the economic loss doctrine, in light of
the absence of competent medical evidence, the admission of Dr. Cole's testimony
is obviously harmless. To the extent, however, that the evidence could arguably
support an exception to the economic loss rule, it should not have been allowed. If
Dr. Cole's testimony is excluded, there would be absolutely no basis for disregard
of the economic loss rule, and the Reighards' claim for economic damages would
fail.
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admitted his inability to opine on medical causation. (R.1700 at p.46). Rather, he
could only "look[] at potential associations and relationships..." Id. He
acknowledged that "Causation is something that's usually difficult and not possible
to [] determine." Id at 49. He could testify only to "associations" between mold
and physical symptoms, and since he had no knowledge as to the type and
quantities of mold, he could testify only generally. Id at 51.
As a Doctor of Public Health, Dr. Cole is potentially qualified to testify from
a public health standpoint, not from a medical standpoint. Dr. Cole cannot make
medical diagnoses and does not have the qualifications to question or evaluate the
diagnoses of the Reighards by physicians. Dr. Cole's training and experience was
irrelevant and inapplicable to the only relevant issue - whether or not Alan and
Aidan's alleged symptoms were caused by the mold - and thus his testimony
should have been excluded.
"A reliability standard is necessary because while often helpful, scientific
testimony also has the potential to overawe and confuse, and even to be misused
for that purpose. Consequently, jurisprudential history reveals a consistent attempt
to ensure the reliability and helpfulness of evidence." Haupt v. Heaps, 2005 UT
App 436,118, 131 P.3d 252. The basis for Dr. Cole's testimony was misplaced,
making his testimony both unreliable and inadmissible. Dr. Cole never had or took
the opportunity to examine or investigate the alleged contamination of the
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Reighards' home firsthand. The Reighards had the mold removed before any
expert was able to inspect it. Consequently, Dr. Cole's testimony was based solely
on photographs of the mold growth, depositions of the Reighards and other
witnesses, and selected portions of the Reighards' medical records. Dr. Cole had
not even visited the Reighards' home when he wrote his expert report.
The references that Dr. Cole cited to support his testimony are not relevant
or reliable in relation to the issues in this case. Most of this literature discusses
medical problems that neither Alan nor Aidan Reighard experienced, for example,
asthma, decreased immune function and depression. Other articles Dr. Cole relies
on discuss occupational exposure to microorganisms in the agricultural industry, a
topic that is unrelated to the issues in this case. Consequently, the information did
not aid the trier of fact in determining the causal relationship between Alan and
Aidan's alleged symptoms and the alleged mold growth and, instead, likely
prejudiced Mr. Yates by making the presence of mold in a residence appear
necessarily dangerous when, in fact, there was nothing to support that conclusion
in this case.
Furthermore, Dr. Cole recognized in his deposition that many of the articles
he was citing were not included in the Damp Indoor Spaces and Health report by
the Institute of Medicine because the Institute did not believe that there was
8

Of course even had he been able to visit the house, Dr. Cole never would have
seen any of the mold, as it had been removed and remediated several years prior.
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sufficient evidence to support the findings in these articles. (R.989). This
demonstrated that these principles are not "generally accepted by the relevant
expert community" as required by Utah R. Evid. 702(c). Consequently, the
reliability standard under Rule 702(b) for the methods and principles underlying
Dr. Cole's testimony will have to be proven by other means.
Neither Dr. Cole nor anyone else ever identified the type of mold or fungus
that was growing in the Reighards' home. There was no evidence as to the amount
of airborne mold at any time during the Reighard's occupancy of the home. A
complete investigation to determine the type of mold or fungus was never
performed. Consequently, the basis for Dr. Cole's testimony regarding the alleged
contamination in the Reighard's home was based solely on speculation as what the
contamination actually might have been. This testimony is of little use to the trier
of fact. As the court in Haupt states, "the trial court must consider whether the
proffered testimony will be helpful to the trier of fact. 'Evidence not shown to be
reliable cannot, as a matter of law, 'assist the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue' and, therefore, is inadmissible.'" Haupt,
2005 UT App. 436, f24 (quoting State v. Rimmasch, 775 P.2d 388, 397-98 (Utah
9

The only test for airborne mold (taken by Charles Dixon who did not testify at
trial), was taken in the master bathroom, and was taken after the sheetrock therein
had been removed by the Plaintiffs and/or their contractor and while the Reighards
were not living in the home. (R.990) And neither Ms. Reighard nor anyone else
could exclude the possibility that this airborne mold originated from the bathroom
carpet or some other source unrelated to a construction defect.
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1989)).
In a recent California Court of Appeals decision on a case very similar to
this one the court stated,
[A]n expert's opinion based on assumptions of fact without evidentiary
support... or on speculative or conjectural factors . . . has no evidentiary
value . . . and may be excluded from evidence.. .. Therefore, an expert's
opinion that something could be true if certain assumed facts are true,
without any foundation for concluding those assumed facts exist in the case
before the jury, does not provide assistance to the jury because the jury is
charged with determining what occurred in the case before it, not
hypothetical possibilities.
Jennings v. Palomar Health Systems, Inc., 114 Cal.App.4th 1108, 1117 (Cal. App.
4th Dist. 2003).
As stated above, Dr. Cole was unable to identify the type of mold or fungus
that was growing in the Reighards' home based solely on the photographs he was
given and a complete investigation to determine the type of mold or fungus was
never performed. Dr. Cole's testimony painted an inaccurately grave picture of the
severity of the mold growth in the Reighards' home based only on speculation, as
the appropriate testing and investigation of the mold was never completed.
Consequently, the basis for Dr. Cole's testimony regarding the type and severity of
alleged contamination in the Reighards' home is based only on conjecture.
Throughout his testimony, Dr. Cole stated that both temporality and a dose
response relationship between Alan and Aidan's alleged symptoms and the alleged
mold growth in their home have been established. However, there is no evidence
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supporting this statement. It is unknown how long the mold was present in the
Reighards' home before it was discovered or how much mold was present in the
home at significant times. It is possible that the mold was present when the
Reighards moved into the home in 2004, one year before Mr. Reighard and Aidan
began experiencing any alleged symptoms and two years before the mold was
discovered. Dr. Cole's assertion that there is both temporality and a dose response
relationship between the alleged mold growth and the plaintiffs' symptoms is thus
based completely on speculation as to when the mold growth started and how
much was present at relevant times.
Finally, Dr. Cole attributed moisture intrusion to poor construction or
shoddy repair. This was a conclusory statement without any foundation that was no
doubt prejudicial to the Defendant, who built the house, and ignores the fact that
the Plaintiffs acknowledged that they themselves had sprinkler repairs and system
modifications conducted after the purchase of the home and before the discovery
of the mold. Various unidentified sprinkler repair people, who may or may not
have been licensed, made sprinkler repairs of which the Plaintiffs can provide no
details; grading changes were made to the exterior of the property; sprinkling
schedules and frequencies may have been altered. Thus, it is impossible to
determine to what extent the conduct of these contractors may have contributed to
the alleged moisture conditions which brought about the mold. This statement by
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Dr. Cole implies that Mr. Yates is to blame for the water intrusion and is based on
mere speculation and accordingly, should be excluded.
V.

THE REIGHARDS SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN AWARDED

COSTS AS PART OF THE FINAL JUDGMENT
On September 17, 2007, Mr. Yates, through counsel, served an Offer of
Judgment, in compliance with Utah R. Civ. P. 68(c),10 on the Reighards in the
amount of $10,000.00. A copy of the Offer of Judgment, originally attached as
Exhibit "A" to Mr. Yates' Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for
Award of Attorney's Fees and Expert Costs (R.1512), is included in the Addendum
as Exhibit "2."
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury awarded the Reighards a judgment
against Mr. Yates in the amount of $12,500.00. (R.1445). This amount was
subsequently adjusted to $7,5000.00 by the trial court to reflect the $5,000.00
settlement between the Reighards and E. Marshall Plastering. (R.1627).
Following the reduction of the verdict, the trial court granted costs in the
amount of $2,919.25 to the Reighards broken down as follows: $505.00 Filing/Pro
Hac Vice Fees, $75.00 Jury Fee, $2,265.25 Deposition Transcripts, $74.00 Witness
Fees. (R.1670). However, because the adjusted award of $7,500.00 was not more
favorable that the $10,000.00 Offer of Judgment which had been made by Mr.

10

The text of Rule 68 is set forth in the Determinative Authority, supra, p. 6.
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Yates to the Reighards in 2007, Mr. Yates should not have been responsible to pay
the Reighards any costs incurred after the Offer of Judgment. See Utah. R. Civ.
68(b). As such, the trial court erred in awarding these costs to the Reighards;
rather, Mr. Yates should have been awarded his costs under this Rule.

VI. MR. YATES WAS THE PREVAILING PARTY AND SHOULD
HAVE BEEN AWARDED ATTORNEY FEES UNDER THE REPC
The Reighards' Complaint included nine causes of action. (R.001). At the
close of the Reighards' case in chief, the Court dismissed three of the causes of
action, and consolidated two more, leaving the jury to be instructed on the claims
respecting breach of contract/breach of warranty, negligence, and negligent
misrepresentation. (R. 1444-1449). The jury's verdict clearly established that Mr.
Yates ultimately prevailed on all causes of action other than the negligence claim;
the jury specifically found that the Reighards themselves had breached the Real
Estate Purchase Contract by failing to abide by the REPC's mediation obligation.
(R.1448).
In spite of the fact that Mr. Yates clearly prevailed on the breach of contract
claim and on seven of the eight remaining claims, the trial court ruled that Mr.
Yates was not the prevailing party and declined to award Mr. Yates his attorney
" Once again, if this Court reverses the jury verdict respecting negligence, this
particular issue becomes moot. In that event, however, the Rule 68 Offer of
Judgment would provide an additional basis for an award of Mr. Yate's costs
incurred after the offer.
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fees and costs under Section 17 (Attorney Fees and Costs) of the REPC. Section
17 states "In the event of litigation or binding arbitration to enforce this Contract,
the prevailing party shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney fees." See
Addendum, Exhibit " 1 . "
A court that is determining who prevailed is to follow the "flexible and
reasoned approach" as clarified mA.K&R Whipple Plumbing & Heating v. Guy,
2004 UT 47, f25. In connection with this determination the Court is to consider,
among other things:
(1) Contractual language,
(2) The number of claims, counterclaims, cross-claims, etc. brought
by the parties,
(3) The importance of the claims relative to each other and their
significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a whole, and
(4) The dollar amounts attached to and awarded in connection with
the various claims.
Radman v. Flanders Corp., 2007 UT App 351, ^[26, 172 P.3d 668.
In this case, Mr. Yates clearly and unequivocally prevailed on the claims
arising from the REPC, which provided the only basis for attorney fees. That in
and of itself should establish the Mr. Yates' status as the prevailing party under the
provision which entitles an award of attorney fees; Mr. Yates having prevailed on
almost all of the other causes of action merely affirms that Mr. Yates should have
been awarded the vast majority, if not all, of the attorney fees which Mr. Yates
incurred in defending against the Reighards' claims.

34

Still further, and based upon the arguments above, the Reighards should not
have prevailed on the negligence cause of action. Mr. Yates had no independent
duty to the Reighards as a builder-contractor, Mr. Yates had no duty to act without
negligence in the building of the home, and based upon the jury's finding of no
physical injury, the Reighards claims were further barred by the economic loss
doctrine.
Additionally, the Reighards specifically attempted, prior to resting, to
reserve their desire and intent to explore Mr. Yates' net worth in the event that they
prevailed on their fraud-based claims. They intended to seek punitive damages
above and beyond the compensatory damages that they were seeking; Mr. Yates'
success must take into account the success in defending against these fraud claims
and the associated risk of punitive damages. Furthermore, even after these fraud
claims were taken away, the Reighards argued in their closing argument for a
judgment at or in excess of $100,000.00; Mr. Yates successfully limited the jury's
award to $12, 500.00. Based upon all these factors, Mr. Yates should have been
considered the prevailing party in this matter and should have been awarded his
costs and attorney fees under the REPC. If this Court reverses the negligence
award, there can be no dispute that Mr. Yates will have prevailed in all respects,
and he should be awarded all of his fees, which were significantly less than the
fees sought by the Reighards.
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CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
By this appeal, Mr. Yates asks this Supreme Court to rule that Mr. Yates had
no independent duty to the Reighards as a builder/contractor because Mr. Yates
was acting in the capacity of a seller of a used home when he contracted with the
Reighards. The trial court's ruling that Mr. Yates owed an independent duty to the
Reighards (and the trial court's denial of Mr. Yates' various motions in that regard)
should be reversed.
In addition, the trial court's denial of Mr. Yates' Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict should be reversed based upon the Davencourt
opinion. Mr. Yates did not have a duty to act without negligence in the building of
the home and there is no independent duty to conform to building codes. Further,
because the jury found no physical injury and there was no admissible evidence of
physical injury to Mr. Reighard and Aidan, the economic loss doctrine bars the
Reighards' claims for negligence. The only plausible evidence respecting physical
injury came through Dr. Cole; he should not have been allowed to testify as to the
effects of mold on Mr. Reighard's and Aidan's health, and if his testimony had
been properly excluded the economic loss rule would apply.
Finally, because Mr. Yates was the prevailing party, and should be the sole
prevailing party in this matter following the reversal of the negligence award, Mr.
Yates should be awarded his costs and attorney fees under the REPC and the trial
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court's denial of these fees should be reversed. The trial court's award of costs to
the Reighards should also be reversed under Utah R. Civ. P. 68, and Mr. Yates'
costs should be awarded.
Mr. Yates also seeks his costs and attorney fees incurred in this appeal.
DATED this

1^ day of December, 2010

LINCOLN^W. HOBBS
JULIELADLE
KATHY A.F.DAVIS
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Appellant were mailed to the following:
Daniel S. Drage
BOYLE & DRAGE, P.C.
2506 Madison Ave
Ogden,UT 84401
Christine E. Drage
Trevor O Resurreccion
WEIL & DRAGE, APC
23212 Mill Creek Drive
Laguna Hills, CA 92653
and an original and nine copies were filed with the clerk of the appellate court.
DATED this J^L day of December, 2010

LIMt^LN W. HOBBS
JPLIE LADLE
KATHY A.F. DAVIS
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
Attorneys for Appellant
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ADDENDUM
1.

Real Estate Purchase Contract (R.0001, Exhibit "A").

2.

Offer of Judgment (R. 1512, Exhibit "A").
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REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
TOiftftaJf^frUyttftdtrigcofrfret. UUhlwr*ijurrt*r«#lest*t*licef>*»t* to us* this tarn. B^rahd3«*k*. however, <Ti*y*sr^ to *tt»r or
<toki*topt&^tom <*)**& 9 dtlk*^ torn*. tfywid*sJtel^0ft>x*dvlc*,«*k!mK
EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT
Buyer
A l * a & gu<y *»i<fo**<>
offers to purchase the Property
«4»^rfh«rt Kfelnw Artrt hereby d&)h/*re trt thi* R m k A f ^ »« PamiHrt MnrW the amount of S XO, ^00 «00 in ^)e form of
Pergonal chuck
which, upon Acceptance of this offer &y all parties (as defined m Section 23),
shall be depositedfenaccordance with state taw.

Received by:

.
m
(Senator* of tgenttbrotor acknowledges rec**** of Earnest Money)

Brokerage:

prvKianti^i tr*»h R M ! ggtat»

on

. Phone Number

(Date)
435-g43-isqo

OFFER TO PURCHASE
1. PROPERTY:

3478

also described as;
City of

Paybr»ak«r Pr
_

Ear* citYL

„

••••

—

TAX XP g JB*-3-513e
County of

groantx

State of Utah, Zxp

64036

(the "Property").

1.1 Included Items* Unless excluded herein, this sate include* mo following Hemeftpresently owned and attached to
the Property: ptombing, heating, air condRJontng natures and equipment; ceafng fans; water heater, buiK-io appliances; light
fixtures and bulbs; bathroom rtxtures; curtains* draperies and rods; window and door screens; storm doors and windows:
window bBnds; awnings; installed television antenna; sateime d&hes and system; p*rm*riMtiy affbted carpats; automatic
garage door opener and accompanying transmitter^); fencing; and trees and shrubs. The following items shall also oe
included in this sale and conveyed under separate B8I of Sale with warranties as to title: ?!»»*« »*» Item T»O an
Mifcftched addeactoyOp* f o r d e t a i l * T
,
mmmm
1.2 Excluded Items. The following items are excluded from this safe: a/a
1.3 Water Rights. The following wain* riohts are Included in this safe: * * * ;to*Mft«*«*fc ey u*w

"

PURCHASE PRIOR The Purchase PHoe for the Prop^ & $
630,ooo,oo
2,1 Method of Payment* The Pwchase Pnoe wiJJ be paid as foflows;
iorooo.oo
(a) Eame«t Money Deposit. Under certain conditions described in this Contract* THIS
DEPOSIT MAY BECOME TOTALLY NON-REFUNDABLE.
530. ooo.oo
(b) New Loan. Buyer agrees to applyfora new Joan as prowled in Section 2.3. Buyer will apply
feroneormoreofthefbiioivlfiglAmH: |»CONVENTIONAL H F H A I I V A
i I OTHER (Spedfy) .
If an FHAA/A k>an applies, see attached FHAA/A Loan Addendum*
If the loan is to incHxfa any particularterms,then chfiex below and give details:
f J SPECIFIC LOAN TERMS
.

$-.,

$.
$
$

120,000.00

(c> Loan Assumption Addendum (Sea attached Assumption Addendum If applicable)
(d) Seller Financing (see attached Seller Financing Addendum if applicable)
{e) Other (specify)
„
uit
(f) Balance or Purchase Price in Cash at Settternent
~

S~-

650,000.00

PURCHASE PRICE. Total of lines (a) through ft)

_ ^
~~~

2.2 Financing Condition, (check applicable box)
ta)
[>0 Buyers obligation to purchase the Property IS conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for th& applicable
*oan(s> rererenceo In Section 2. H*>) or (c) rihe "Loan*). This condition t» referred to a* the Ttoneing Condition *
(b)
I I Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer qualifying for a loan.
Section 2.3 does not apply,
A
Pag* 1 Of 6 pa$**

Sellers Initials

Date

^ | ^ r > initial*

^ Dat*

T&t* ioxm i a **tfcori*ad f o r u«m by Al Bmrbo#&, & »eaiw»r o*
tfcf *%r
*%r* c<Uy «a«xd o* Sumito**.
J! tfef

0 3 / 2 5 / 2 0 0 0 0 3 : 4 5 FAX 435 649 4 7 7 3
32/06/2884

63:05

$

14356491581

A W

S SAMVKV
AL BARBOSA P R U D D ^ M

5L3 Application for Loan*
(«) Buyer's duties. No later than the Loan Application A Fee 0**d!in* refemnrari in Section 24(a). Buyer $baH
appty for the Loan. "Loan Application* occurs only when Buyer has: 0) completed, signed, and delivered to the lender ah*
"Lender*) the initial loan application md documentation required by the Lender and 0i) paid all loan appftcaltion fees a*
required by the Lender. Buyer agreas io diligently worn to attain tb* Loan. Buyer will promptly provide the Lender with ?ny
additional documentation as required by the Lender.
(b) Procedure if toon Application ts denied. If Buyer receives written notice from the Lender that U\e Lend**
docs not approve fb* Loan <a "Notice of Loan Denial*). Buyer shell no later than three calendar days thereafter, provide a
copy to Sefier. Buy.*r or Seller may, within three calender days alter Seller's receipt cf such notice, cancel this Contract In*
providing written notice to the other party. In the event of a cancellation under this Section 2.p(b): (i) If the Notice of Lot*.
Denial wa$ received by Buyer no later than the Loan Denial Deadline referenced in Section 24(d). the Earnest Moatv
Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; © If the Notice of Loan Denial was received by Buyer after that date, the fiercest
Money Deposit shall be released to Seller, and Seller agrees to accept as Sellers exclusive remedy the Earnest Money
Deposit a? liquidated datmoes. A failure to cancel as provided in this Section 2.3(b) shall have no effect on the fmmur#
Condition set forth in Section 2.2(a). Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other section ottrus Contract snart u?
governed by such oiher provisions.
2.4 Appraisal condition. Buyer's obligation to purchase the Property Pi 13 I J IS NOT conditioned upon the Proper? /
appraising for not less than tne Purctose Price. This condition Is r&ferreo to as trie "Appraisal Condition*. If trio Appier i
Condition applies and the Buyerreceiveswritten notice from the Lender that the Property as appraised for less than the
Purchase Price (a "Notice of Appraised Vafeia"), Buyer may cancel this Contract by providing a copy of such wntten notice
to Seller no later than three days after Buyers receipt of suon wrtoen norlcc. In the event of a cancellation under th*
Section 2.4; (r) if th* Notfce of Appraised Value was received by Buyer no later thAn the Appraisal Deadline referenced «n
Section 24(e), the Earnest Money Deposit shall be returned to Buyer; (i) if the Notice of Appraised Value was received i*t
Buyer after that dale, the fcamesi Money Deposit shall t** teteeaed to Seller, and Setter egroco to accept as seto't.
exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages. A fellum to cancel as provided in this Section 2A
shall be deemed a waiver of the Appraisal Condition by Buyer. Cancellation pursuant to the provisions of any other sectc-.'
of tftis contract snaH be governed by such other provisions.
X

SETTLEMENT AND CLOSING.

Settlement shall tafce place on the Settlement Deadline referenced in Section 24(f), or on a date upon which Buyer cv:
Seller agree in writing, "Setttemertf shall occur only when all of the following nave been completed: <a) Buyer and Sa'tei
have signed and d^rivorod to •»ch other or to the esa*vw/rJos*no office all documents required by this Contract, by »t*v
Lender, by written escrow instructions or by applicable law; (b) any monies required to be paid by Buyer under ihast.
documents {except for the proceeds of any new loan) h^vn been dtfrvemd by Buyer io Seller or to lbs escrow/closfog orcein the form of mRfe-tad or cleared funds: and (c) any monies required to be paid by Setter under these documents hay;-.
been defivered by Seller to Buyer or to the escrow/closing office In the form of collected or cle&red funds, setter ^nd Buy' *
shall each pay one-half (#) of me fee charged by the escrew/cfosfno office for ft$ services in the $ettiement/cfc>$— \
process. Taxes and assessments for the current year, rents, and Interest on assumed obligations shall be proratec' u
Settlement as set forth In this Section. Tenant deposits (including, but not limrted tor security deposits* clean Irty depose
and prepaid rents) shall be paid or credited by Seller to Buyer at settlement. Prorations set forth in this Section sbatf be
me4e as of the Settlement Deadline date referenced in Section 24(0, unless otherwise agreed to in writing by the parses.
Such writing could <ntfude the settlement statement. The transaction will be considered do^ed when Settlement has fc&c«>
completed, and wtwn all of the following have been completed: (i) the proceeds of any new loan have been delivered ty
the Lender to Seller or to the escrow/dosing office; and (B) the applicable Closing documents have been recorded »r . -coffice of the county recorder. The actions described in parts (!) andfli)ortho preceding aentcne© shall be completed WHU?-.
four calendar days of Settlement,
4.

POSSE33ION. Seltet shall deliver physical possession to Buyer within: bd _ 34 hours { |

days after Closing.

( J Other (specify).
5,

I

CONFIRMATION
> N<S
2 pE»E
EN
I C Y DISCLOSURE. At the signing of this Contract:

} Seller** Initials
*[ 1I B
Buyers Initials
ialsf

The Listing Agent,
—
The Listing Broker,

Page 2 of 6 pages

Ba*rbAr»

gangord

Prudential Utah RB~SV

Sorter's Initials

T h i s foxl» 1 » mutJott^AJt^l tor

Date

represent E*3 Seller I 3 Buyer [ ] both Buyer and Seller
as a Unfitted A gent;
represents £ J Seller [ ] Buyer £K$ both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent:

^ j^^y****

u » * b y A l Box*****, * »»*£>«r- c»£ th+

fc>H*als

^ _ &•*<>_

JPax* C i t y J5ot»rd &£ k ^ a l t o r e .

03/25/2000 03:40 FAX 435 649 477$
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, represents I I Seller p<J Buyar I J both Buyer and Seltar
s& a Limited Agenv

The Selling Broker,

P r u d e n t i a l vtah

ftg-sv

represents f I S«l!«r [ J Buyer M both Buyer and Seller
as a Limited Agent

e. TITLE INSURANCE, At Settlement, Seller agrees to pay for a standard-coverage owner's policy of title insurance
insuring Buyer In me amount of the Purchase Price. Any additional title insurance coverage shall be at Buyer's expense
7* SELLER DISCLOSURES. No later than the Seller Disclosure Deadline referenced In Section 240), Seller snail provide
ro Buyer thefollowingdocuments which are collectively referred to as the "Seller Disclosures";
M a Seller property condition disclosure for the Property, signed and dated by Seller:
(b) a commitment for the policy of title insurance;
(c) a copy of ai>y leases affecting the Property not expiring prior to Closing;
(d) written notice of any claims and/or conditions known to Seller relating to environmental problems and building w
zoning code violations; and
(ft) Other(specffy)cc^>yi, fttttSflt go* *K*mfg R fry*^, M,»* *ftffi>

8, BUYER'S RIGHT TO CANCEL BASED ON EVALUATIONS AND INSPECTIONS. Buyer's oblation to purchase
under thle Contract {cb*ck applicable box**):

(a) [Xj IS { ] 1$ NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the content of all the Seller Disclosures referenced in

Section 7:
(b) t x l 13 I | IS NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of* physical condition Inspection o n t o propeily,

(c) I J IS M *S NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of a survey of the Property by a licensed surveyor {'Survey"};
(d) txj IS f J is NOT conditioned upon Buyer's approval of the cost, terms and availably of homeowner's insurance
coverage for the Property;
(e) {XJJS ( ]*$ NOT conditioned upon Buyers approval of thefollowingtests and evaluations of the Property; (specify)
B»rif»n i Tya-tr

.

if any of the above terns ere checked In the affirmative, then Sections 8.1, e.2r a.3 and 6,4 apply; otherwise, they do not
apply. The items checked In the affirmative above are collectively referred to as the -Evaluations & Inspections/ Unless
otherwise provided in this Contract, the Evaluations & Inspections shall be pafej for by Buyer Bnd shall be oondiid** by
individuals or entittes of Buyers choice. Seller agrees to cooperate with the Evaluations & Inspections and with the wa*
through inspection uftder Section 11 8,1 Evaluations & Inspections Deadline. No later than the Evaluations & Inspections Deadline referenced in $ectfc&
24(c) Buyer snail: (a) complete all Evaluations & Inspections: &nd (b> determine if the Evaluations & inspections a??
acceptable io Buyer.

&JL Right to Cancel or Object If Buyer determines that the Evaluations & Inspections are unacceptable. Buyer may,
no internum UIB Evaluations & inspections Deadline, eitner: (a) cancel this Contract by providing written nofece to Seller,
whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer; or (b) provide Seller with written notice of objections.
$.3 Failure to Responds If by the expiration of the Evaluations $ Inspections Deadline. Buyer does not: (a) cancel
this Contract as pro\ided in Section a .2; or (b) deliver u written objection to Seller regarding the Evaluations & inspections
the Evaluations & inspections shall be deemed approved by Buyer
5.4 Response by Seller. If Buyer provides written objections to Seller, Buyer and Seller shzl) have seven calendar
days after Seller's receipt of Buyer's objections (the "Response Period-) In whtoh lo agree In wribny upon tt*e manner ot
resolving Buyer's objections. Except as provided in Section 10J2, Seller may, but shall not be required to, resolve Buyers
objections. If Buyer and Seller nave not agreed in writing upon trie manner of resolving Buyer's objections, Buyer me?
cancel this Contract by providing written notice to Seller no !$ter than three oalemtor doyo after expiration of the Response

Period; whereupon the Earnest Money Deposit shall be released to Buyer. If this Contract is not canceled by Buyer uncct
this Section a,4. Buyer's objections shall be deemed waived by Buyer. This waiver shall not affect those items warrantee in
Section 10.
9. ADDITIONAL TERMS- There p<J ARE { 1 ARE NOT addenda to this Contract containing additional terms. If there are
the terms of the following addenda are Incorporated into this Contract by th'ts reference: [ X J Addendum wo.one
[ J Seller Financing Addendum [ J FHAAfA Loan Addendum [ 1 Assumption Addendum f J Lead-eased PzUr<
Disclosure & Acknowledgement (in some transactions this disclosure w required by law) I 1 Lead-Based Paint
Addendum On soma transactions this addendum is rewired by law) £ 1 Other (SDBCHV)
„__
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10. SfcLLER WARRANTIES fc REPRESENTATIONS.
10.1
Condition of Title, Seller represents that Seller has fee title to the Property 2nd wiH convey good ai\C
marketable title to Buyer at Closing by genera! warranty deed. Buyer agrees, however, to accept title to the Property
subject to the following matters ot record: aasernents, de^H resrHcrlona, CC&R's (meaning covenants, conditions anr*
restrictions), and ri<}hts*of-way; and subject to me contents of the Commitrnertt for Title Insurance as agreed to by Buye*
under Section 8. Buyer also agrees to take the Property subject to existingteasesaffecting the Property and not expiring
prior to Closing. Buyer agroos to be responsible for t»*esk assessments* homeowners association duas, utilities, and other
services provided to the Property after Closing. Except for any toan(s) specifically assumed by Buyer under Section 2.1 (c).
Seller will cause to be paid off by Closing all mortgages, trust deeds, Judgments, mechanics liens, tax tens and warrant.*
Seller v/Bi cause to be paid current by Ck>sinQ all Assessments and homeowners association dues.
10.2
Condition of Property. Seller warrants that the Property will be in the fblowing condition ON THE D A i t
SELLEft DEUVERS PHYSICAL POSSESSION TO BUYER:
(a) the Property shall be broom-clean and free of debris and personal belongings. Any Seller or tenant moving-reiated
damage to the Prof >erty shall be repaired at Sellers expense;
(b) the heating, cooling, electrical, plumbing a,rni sprinkler systems and fixtures, *nd the appliances and fireplaces wt»»
be in working order andfittortheir intended purposes;
<c) the roof and foundation shall be free of leaks known to Seller:
(d) any private well or septic tank serving the Property shall have applicable permits* and shaU be in working order zu<\
fit for \is Intended purpose: and
te) the Property and improvements, including the landscaping, will be m the £UHI* general condition as they were on
the date of Acceptance,
10v3 Home Warranty Plan. The "Home Warranty Plan" referenced in this Section 10.3 is separate from fr*
warranties provider by Seller under Sections 10,t and 10,2 above. (Check applicable box«e);

A one .year Horn*

Warranty Plan { J WILL fXJ WILL NOT be included m this transaction. If Included, the Home Warranty Plan shalt 'c <
ordered by t J Buyer I } Seller and shall be issued by a company selected by | ] Buyer [ ] setter, The cost of the Hor.*
Warranty Pktfi shall not exceed S
and shell be paid for at Settlement by £ ] Buyer { J Setter.
11. WALK-THROUGH INSPECTION* Before Settlement, Buyer may, upon, reasonable notice and at a reasonable time.
conduct a •Valk-thioogh* inspection of the Property to determine only that the Property is *es represented,* meaning tnet
the ilems referenced in Sections 1.11 8,4 and 10.2 ("the items'^ are respectively present, repaired/changed as agreed. ano
\n the warranted condition. If the items are not as represented, Seller will, prior to Settlement, replace* correct or repair th*
items or> wftft th« consent of Buyer (and Lender if ann^^bfe), escrow an amount at Settlement to provide for the seme.
The failure to conduct a walkthrough Inspection, or to claim that an item is not as represented, shall not constitute a wa*v*r
by Buyer of the right to receive, on the date of possession, the items as represented,
12. CHANGES PURlNG TRANSACTION. Seller agrees thatfromthe date of Acceptance until the date of Ckwng, none </*
the following shall occur without the prior wntten consent of Buyer: (a) no changes \n any existing leases shall &e made; (r;
no new leases shall be entered Into; (c) no substantial alterations or improvements to the Property shall be matfe c.
undertaken; and (d) no furtherfinancialencumbrances to the Property shall be made.
13. AUTHORITY OF SIGNERS, If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, tnist, estate, limited liability company, »?
other entity, the person executing mis contract on rts behalf warrants his or her authority to do so and tu bind Buyer antf
Seller.
14. COMPLETE CONTRACT.

This Contract together with m addenda* any attached exhibits, and Seller Disclosure*

constitutes the entire Contract between (he parties and supersedes and replaces any and all prior negotiations.
representations, warranties, understandings or contracts between the parties. This Contract cannot be changed except Dy
written agreement of die parties.
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. The parties Bgree that any dispute, arising prior to or after Closing, related to this Contract
(check applicable box)
IX! SHALL
t 1 MAY AT THE OPTION OF THE PARTIES
first be submitted to mediation. If tho parlies agree to mediation, the dispute shaH be submitted to mediation through 1
mediation provider mutually agreed upon by the parties. Each party agrees to bear its own costs or mediation, if medrauon
Tails, the other procedures and remedies available ur\6&r this Contract shall apply. Nothing In this Section 15 shall pwhlbW
any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pftnrttng mediation.

1$. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults, Seller may elect either to retain tto Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or v..
Page4orspages
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returnftand sua Buyer to specifically enforce this Contract or pursue 6ilm remedies available at few* If Seller defaults, in
addition to return of the Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect either to accept from Seller 3 sum equal to tht Earnest
Money Deposit as liquidated damages, or may su$ SeBer to specifically enforce this contract or pureue other remedies
available at law. If Buyer elects to accept liquidated damages, Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages to Buyer upon
demand. It b agreed that 6Mi^\ of a Loan Application made by the Buyer is not a defeult and Is governed by Section
2.3(b).
17, ATTORNEY FEES AMO c o s t s , in the event of WioaUon or bindmg arbitration to enforce this ContoCL tho prevailing
party shatl he emitted to costs and reasonable attorney fees. However, attorney fees snail not oe awaro*$u (or participation
in mediation under Section 15.
IB. NOTICES* Except as pfovki0<i In Section 23, all notices required und^r this contract mim be: (a) in willing; (b) s*$ncd
by the party giving notice; and {c> recerved by the other party or the other party's agent no later ihat\ the applicable date
referenced In thte Contract
19. ABROGATION, Except for the provisions of Sections 10.1, 10.2, 15 and 17 and express warranties made In this
Contract, the provisions of this Contract shall not apply after Closing.
20. RISK OF LOSS. AH risk of loss to the Property, including physical damage or destruction to the Property or n«
Improvements due to any cause exespt ordinary wear and tear and loss caused by a taking m eminent domain, shall oe
borne by Seller until the transaction t$ closed.
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE, Time Is of the essence regarding the dates set forth in this Contract. Extensions must be
agreed lo in wnung &y a» pantos, u*>h*as otherwise expltoijy stated )n this Contract (a> performance under each Sectmi;
of this Contract which refemnces a date shall absolutely be required by 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the stated date; and (b)
the term "days* shall mean calendar days and shall be counted beginning on the day following the event which triggers the
timing requirement (Le.> Acceptance, Notfoe of toan Denial, etc.). Performance dates and times referenced herein shaJ not
be binding upon title companies, lenders, appraisers and others not parties to this Contract, except as otherwise agreed m
m writing by such non-party.
22. FAX THANSMJSSION AND COUNTERPARTS- Facsimile (fax) transmission of a signed copy of this Contract any
addenda and counteroffers, and the retransmission of any signed fax shall be the same as delivery of an original, Th*s
Contract and any addenda and counteroffers may be executed in counterparts.
23. ACCEPTANCE "Acceptance* occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding to an offer or counteroffer of the other, (a)
th& offer or counteroffer where noted to indicate acceptance; and (b) communicates to the other party or to the other
party's agent that the offer or counteroffer has been signed as fequirw).
SIQOS

24. CONTRACT DEADLINES. Suyer and Seller agree that the fbffowjng deadlines shall apply to this Contract:
(a) Loan Application & Fee Deadline

February

9tb

3004

(Date)

\b) Seller Disclosure Deadline

February

16*h

3004

(Date)

(c) Evaluations & Inspections Deadline

March

XSth

2004

(Date)

(d) Loan Denial Deadline

March

3i«t

2004

(Date)

,u y a r c b

3Iat

3004

(Dsst&y

April

29th

3004

(Date)

(a) Appraisal Deadline

(f) Settlement Deadline

25. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the Property on me shove terms and conditions ft
Seller does not accept this offer by: $*oo [ ] AM CXJ PM Mountain Time on
February
strh 2004 (Date;.
th\& offer shall iap$&; end tho Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money Deposit to Buyer,
ycf*s Sio/ioture)

(Offer Date)

•^Mmf/« Sipnature)

(Offer Date)

w
5 Of 6 pagen
3*her*a Initial* ,
Pate
^ i ^ K f r r ^ initial*
Oat*
tovm i s author!**d for us* by M &arfeo»A, a *«ab*r ott tm ?ar>
?*T* City »oard z£ Realtor*.

.
^2Si*?rK?*

82/06/28*4
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Th# later of tha abov« Offer Dates sha* be warned io as the ''Offer R«fere»c» 0*tc"

ens'Names) (PLEA5E PRINT)
(Btyert

(Notice Address)

(ZioCode)

(Phone)

ACC£PTAr*CeCCHJNTCROFFEWREJECTlON
CHECK ONE:
[ ) ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER TO PURCHASE: Seller Adepts the fbreQOing offer on the terms and conditions specified
abov*.
I J COUNTEROFFER: Seller presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyers offer subject to the exceptions o?
modifications as specified in the attached ADDENDUM NO,
^
(Seller's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Sellers' Names) (PLEASE PRINT)

(Sellers Signature)
(Notice Address)

(Date) (Time)
(Zip Code)

(Phone)

C J RfcJECTtoWt ^tterRe^c*sthefbreoomaoflfer.
(Meier's Signature)

(Date) (Time)

(Setter's Signature)

(Dfcte) (Time)

DOCUMENT RECEIPT
State lew requires Broker to furnish Buyer and Setter w3th copies of this Contract bearing ell signatures. (Fit) in applicable
section below)
A* I acknowledge ieeeipt of a final copy of the tbreoomg Contract bearing ell signatures:
(Buyer's signature)

(Seller's Signature)

""

pate)

(Buyers S&oature)

(One)

(Sellers signature)

(Date)

~

pate)

8. I personally caused a final copy of trie foregoing Contract bearing all signatures to be J 3 faxed J 1 malted ( ) har^c
delivered on
„
(Date), postage pmpa\& to the I J Sejler I J Buyer.
Sent/Delivered by (specify)
«-~--«__^w--^_^___^
.
THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAt ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFP1CE OF THf: UTAH ATTORNEY G£*JfRAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST *, 30OX IT REPtACES AND SUPERSEDES Alt PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSION* OF THIS FORM,

Page 6 or 6 pages

Seller* initiate

Date

^r%er tnjtml*
^Bi^er'e

Date.

Tiiia form i a «utJfto<*ix^i f o r UB« by x i 8*jrbas», * » w b e r of tfe# F*rX c i t y Board of *«o3.tora»
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I ) REJECTION: 6OtarR»jHMmt«X90ol»s offer.
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B<flrt/DttUM«*»dfoftp«aM

»*»« * «wr« # * * « »

ft+ft+i**

r

J

tawir*

C p * n w t»«fttt *»

tigMft**;

. , — .„ . ,

*

^»

**«
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*ftiffBf&*
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03:05

14356491581
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A D D E N D U M NO. o>x*

TO
REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
THIS 1$ AN [ X ] ADDENDUM { J COUNtHROFFER to thai REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (ths "REPC) wftf^
an Offer Reference Date of
y*isniA?>r
5trh 2004 . Including all prior M<im4a pod counteroffer*, betwe&f>
Alan 4 Suxy Rtilghayd
as Buyer, and flfceven T YAtes
,
as Seller
ragaitJJr>0 the Property located at 3478
Payfcreaker P r
Park c i t y
9T
8409a
The
fotkxvtn£ t*rme arc* herefcy Incorporated oe part of the REPC:

1, Seller to provide & install missing hardware on doors in bagemeut2. AJS par Item 1.1 of tho SBPC the following items apply:
* A l l fc*jr Stoole in,fcJxoKitcHa*x

*
*
*
+

All attached light f ixtuxes
Big Screen TV in the Media Room
All BXeocronic Equipment & components in the Madia Room
Snow-blowex in the gnmgo.

BUYER AND SEUER AGREE THAT THE CONTRACT DEADUNES REFERENCED IN SECTION 24 OF THE REPC
(CHECK APPLICABLE BOX): tX] REMAIN UNCHANGED I J ARE CHANGED AS FOLLOWS:
„
To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with my provisions of the? REPC% including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shaft comroL AB other terms of the REPC, including *» prior addenda and counteroffers
not modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same, D O Seller I 1 B u f y e l ^ ^ h a y « u r ' t i l ., *r9P I J AM D<J PM
Mountain Time on
Tmhrn*xry
6 t h 2pp4 (Dale), lo accept the terms of this ADDENDUM In accordance with the
provisions of
of Section
Section 23
23 of
of the
the REPC.
REPC. Unless
Unless so
so accepted,
accepted, the
the orceins
offen»s set
Provisions
t forth in this ADDENDUM shall fef^e.
' ^ p B u y e f I JsallerSignature

(Date)

(time)

^ ^ M Buyer{ ] seller Signature

(Date)

(Time)

ACC^PTA NCeCOUNTEROFFER/REJECTlON

CHECK ONE.
t J ACCEPTANCE! i } Seller £ 1 Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.
[ } COUNTEROFFER: [ J Seller { J Buyer presents as a coonteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.
(Signature)

'

"~

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

™~——

"p"^)'

(Time)

(Date)

(Ttfn*)

{ ] REJECTION: £ l $ * t k r f J Buyer n&jecte the foregoing ADDENDUM.
(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPRO* CD BY THE UTAH WEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND T H * OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTO W E Y GEWEftAL.
EFFECTIVE AUGUST * , 2003, fX REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES AtL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.

Tkta f o r * i * Au^hotlxed for aee by AX Saorfco**, * B^ab** *£ *&* Park City B©*ra of

Realtors

'FEB^OS-gJ04 THlJ'02123 Pft"LOVE-COHMUNfCATIUNH
fvb Qti Of 12:4->p
»J/t>5/2804

69; &5

"VfiX'NU. aulbTa a w i

Sef*^t S t a f f

"* r. u

ssa^lia

143^&4915BJ

f

« - WRBOS* PRUDENTM
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ADDENDUM NO. * *
TO
REAt ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
Tim \S AN |*JADDSNOOM | J C0Ut*T&iOf H?* to ttu* KEAL ESTATE PURCHASg CQNTKAOY $ht TOPO'wto
#n OfJtr JWm*co Dale pt
r<^^cv
j t > 3004 . {ncJu<fir>9 •>» *>*tof ***&**):* «i*f Douokwoffcrf> beiwwi

jq*ft »tsu»y « A J ^ ^

n Soyer. and $P*™n * _pnm»

nftAttiino ma Practtrtv bc»t»d a g o t
DaybwJtf 0*
fofcWtrxg l##rtW Of* hemby inoorpontf** 3*pA<* «* » * JfcfPfc:

~

»s Stfor,

i

»agfc C i t y

w

friqgs

. 7J»

1> £ oil or co prorvid© & JUa^tali missing bard**re oa door* in hajtemat*
*
*
*
*

XXI
JU1
Dig
Ail

* B * S t o o l * l a tfe* K i t c h t o i
AtC*ch<va X i g k t £ i x t r a r * »
Sex**!* TV i u tha K a d i * tQgoi
ftWotrftnio E q u t p w ^ t fc C<»*pCtt*#tttii i*» tfc* K#&U Itoaa

WJYW AND JfHJUiK AGK&E THAT T H * CC^TRACT 0£ADUN£* Kfc*>£A£NCtO tW 3 W 7 W N Z* Of TftC REPC
fCHfcCK A*»PUCA0't£ »OX); W JtfcMAJM UJtfCKAAKrSD f J ARC CHAtffcCD A« POtUOtftti

T*fooo^rt^i*m*of$i*AD08WM
4Mjf cquni#ti>rrr^ m**o wm* «ft4« sonttot AJI other <tm» of (he R£PC. tou^^g a* prior *WwKfr and (Wtftfolfers,
notrnodlfttf
toyttrf*AOO£ND^^
DO**W*<I I ttt»f 4ftmhaMnm« frtoo f JAMpOPM
IfcuMaln T*w» on
r»frr\»fc*Y
gtor-r|.9P*rfl>ateL to acoepitf*f«m» ortofcADDENDUM in iccorcfcmcB *lfc fo*

^ ^ t i Wfatt

,

,

IKkAef gi^turS

(Qift)""'' (Time)

^

p

f

s

S

y

S

^

<TV*3^

AWgi»rANc«/cowteK)(pi^ibf^^

"f' J B€^cnrtdNj/t J ^ l ^ r j J B«y*r reacts me ^flogo^g AOP^MOtiM,
(SHX^w)
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ADDENDUM NO. 2~-

REALTOR

TO

• ^"* *

REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

*""

THIS IS AN I J ADDENDUM f x j COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "REPC") with
an OfferReference Date pi
<?:/Y/0'*f
including all prior addenda and counteroffers, between
Alo^fSa^
l?Gt&M/l &hl^„ as Buyer, and
*Shzu£+>* jA r£S
as Seller,
regarding the Property located at
a V Iff
J>MLh^e<x fr^/~ A » - 7~ *>*+*& CJ+/
X-VblTFrThe
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of the REPC:
7

(Ziyi*.

H^

PtL^>j*s^ Ph.;c^ ^Uil A*. ^£g&,

fro-o.—.

iJuj^t-fUveJ.

-j£

(±) 1I-P &iK<Jej-u><LAA-h. r d t-e&xt / / P . /-IDA m\»Ltl*>s.
K*,*d.

-ft* J*

^

~~

^ * - M/)A

vSggAfV-aAyk

h*L

hofr>&~ -h> ^0

Ml

So.

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC, including ail prior addenda
and counteroffers, the$e terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all pnor addenda and counteroffers, not
modified by this ADDENDUM shall remain the same. [ ] Seller (^Buyer shall have until ~5~(ax$ [ } AM \J$PW
Mountain Time A g ^ f - a / i H / / X
*Zec\'}
to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance with the
prQvi§ioiyt oXSecti9Q4J3 of the FfePC Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth in this ADDENDUM shall lapse.
I ] Buyer
[ M Se&fer
Suffer Signature
fyer fXf

'Date
' 0a\6

'

Time

( }Buyer( J Sailer Signature

Oate

Time

ACCEPTANCE/COUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE;
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: { ] Seller { ) Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM
I

J COUNTEROFFER: [ } Seller { ) Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.

(Signature)
[ ]

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

.

(Date)

(T\mQ)

(Date)

(Time)

REJECTION! [ J Seller f J Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FORM APPROVED BY THE UTAH HEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 1 7 , m S . IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS FORM.

6/96 Rev 8/98

UAR Form 2

US/ £Z/£.WK>

UUJOi 1*AA 400 0*W 4/fO

tf A f t l / D OAi\rU*U>
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ADDENDUM NO. 3 - .
TO
REAC ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT

THIS IS AN C J ADDENDUM ^COUNTEROFFER to that REAL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT {the "REPC") With
iripr addenda and counteroffers, between
an Offer Reference Date of
£-fLj/cT
including all prior
— _;>SJfttfStL *YATES
as Seller,
AI<L» I SuxA -R.&l&H~AfLti">
'as Bwer. and
)J^£*j£jLh~£>.>r , / V * k d-itj
VVeftT - The
regarding the Property located at A • / ? y
J)&Jhi-e
following terms are hereby incorporated as part of th/REPC

••C•/•«»-^ e , A y J - A k a / 2 ) e ^ / / / " n «. -S Ac//
TZ-j^tA^n -f* i

.4fc_ikfc<LlL. Si/

^

^

-k

To the extent the terms of this ADDENDUM modify or conflict with any provisions of the REPC» including all prior addenda
and counteroffers, these terms shall control. All other terms of the REPC, including all prior addenda and counteroffers^not
modified by this AODENOUM sheH remain m same. [ J Setter Qi Buyer shall have until ^£Z£Q
[ J AM pjfPft}
Mountain Time / ^ e J b M A ^ W / X *7~e<f>*/
to accept the terms of this ADDENDUM in accordance wrth th^
PXSfid^on/of Section 23 of the'REPC.Unless so accepted, the offer as set forth In this ADDENDUM shall lapse.
[ ]BuyerpqsefldrSignature

Date

Time

[ JBuyerf J Seller Signature

Date

Time

ACCEPTANCE/CCUNTEROFFER/REJECTION
CHECK ONE:
[ ] ACCEPTANCE: {
I

J COUNTEROFFER:! ] Seller! ] Buyer presents as a counteroffer the terms of attached ADDENDUM NO.^

(Signature)
f ]

] Seller [ J Buyer hereby accepts the terms of this ADDENDUM.

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Dale)

(Time)

REJECTION: C ! Setter f I Buyer rejects the foregoing ADDENDUM.

(Signature)

(Date)

(Time)

(Signature)

THIS FOfiM APPROVED BY THE UTAH KEAL ESTATE COMMISSION AND THE OFFICE OF THE UTAH ATTORNEY GENEfcAL,
EFFECTIVE AUGUST 1?,1$98, IT REPLACES AND SUPERSEDES ALL PREVIOUSLY APPROVED VERSIONS OF THIS f ORW.

6/96 Rav. 8/93

UAB Form Z

62/05/2884

23:34

£> AIM/

14356431501
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ADDENDUM NO v 2 s .
TO
R6AL ESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT
TWl£tSAN[ JAODEMDUMiXjCOUi

ROfFERtot
[OFFER to thatfiEALESTATE PURCHASE CONTRACT (the "BE PC?)««.
' ",«frtg «»orforadttemfe owl wunteroflsre between

/££—

tcw»*ifi5> ifi.Wis €»/* f Miroby fw*ww»»ed a s pjut of the REKCJ

-_iA<J ^Lut&tJJejigJ'......

/

,

^L

To \ho detent (ho tw m* ot this ADDENDUM mwfity or canfltcl w'th any provisions ot Ifce RETC, inctiaSng att pffor acWoi ida

JSSS&kj^ ^ t g ^ * 3 ^ of ihd PlEPC, UmoS^o accap&tf,tfw*ofter $5 sot forth to tl*ils ADD£N&'J& *h&flfe{>a
krSfctn^m

'Date

r

Tima

{ )Buyjw( J Seller Signature

Dal©

TUTICI

ACcepTANce/couwt^Hopp^R/ReaecTiow
> ^ X ^OCEPlANCfis f

1 W ^ X S u ^ r h*fsi>y t e a m * Ui* mrm* 0/ IN& AO0£NDUMilmi^faf this tohiw of 0Btod^tfAppjP4QUW WO..^

_

<%nan»rc}

(0$J$)

(Time)

($kjn&tun»)

'duo**.-'''*' K'W»

(Oat^)

COfno)

t H $ PO^M ^W»fVOVC/> a y THC UTAH »OU. WTArit COMMf^KJI* A N 5 tW* O W e « OJ» TMC UtAM Arr©<W$Y OPNK*t41,

CFPhDCt tV/fc A^Ctim* M,\im- Xt «a»LAC€$ AND tfUp^SSDGS AU. ^BVKHWtY A^POVSO Vt3WBIDN» OT THIS FOAM.

Tab 2

LINCOLN W. HOBBS, ESQ. (4848)
JULIE LADLE, ESQ. (11223)
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.
Attorneys for Defendant Steven Yates
466 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801)519-2555
Facsimile: (801)519-2999
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, SILVER SUMMIT, STATE OF UTAH
ALAN REIGHARD, an individual; SUZY
REIGHARD, an individual; AIDAN
REIGHARD, a minor, by and through his
general guardian, SUZY REIGHARD,

OFFER OF JUDGMENT

Plaintiffs,
Civil No. 070500061
v.

Judge Bruce Lubeck

STEVEN YATES- an individual; and DOES 1
through 10, Inclusive,
Defendants.
Pursuant to Utah R, Civ. P. 68. Defendant Steven Yates, through counsel, hereby offers
judgment to be taken against him by Plaintiffs Alan Reighard. Suzy Reighard. and Aidan
Reighard in the total amount of SI (\0O0.G0, which includes all costs, expenses, attorney fees,
interest, and all other sums to which Plaintiffs and their counsel may be entitled.
This offer shall remain effective for ten (10) days after service on counsel for Plaintiffs.

502-Out OiTcrJuJgmt

DATED this if

day o f - 0 ? r ^ ^ . 2007.
HOBBS & OLSON, L.C.

LINCOLN W. HOBBS
JULIE LADLE
Attorneys for Defendant Steven Yates

SH2?MJ1 OilcrJudgmt

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
./

I hereby certify that on t h e : y ^ day of

j

^Cl^^Mr"

. 2007,1 caused a true and

correct copy of the foregoing OFFER OF JUDGMENT to be served upon the following in the
manner indicated:
Daniel S. Drage
BOYLE & DRAGE, P.C.
2554 So. Monroe Blvd.
Ogden, UT 84401
Facsimile 801-394-4923
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

\H Mail

T4-Fax
( ] Fed Ex
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ ] Personally Served
[ ) Email
|<LMail
T/iFax
i I Fed Ex
[ ] Hand Delivery
[ | Personally Served
[ ] Email

Christine E, Drage
Trevor O. Resurreccion
WEIL & DRAGE, APC
23046 Avenida de la Carlota, Ste. 350
Laguna Hills, CA 92653
Facsimile 949-837-9300
Co-counsel for Plaintiffs

--^y^ n* 4-^-

5027 Oil OffcrJudgmt

3

\y~J*t&UA\~

